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The 41-story building was quiet in the 
early evening, most of its people gone 
for the day. It was Tuesday, last 
April 11th Scattered here and there 
in the structure a few clusters of people 
worked on, intent upon pressing projects. 
The first sign of something wrong came 
when smoke began to puff softly 
from the stairwell 
On the 15th floor of the Chicago Board 
of Trade Building, which houses the 
Chicago H&S office, members of the 
report department and of the tax 
department, along with several other 
people were still at work. What they 
could not immediately know was thai 
fire had broken out a few floors below. 
The burning 10th floor, in fact, had 
had no tenant for months while being 
renovated. One flight below that, where 
during earlier hours the hectic dealing 
in silver and soy bean futures takes 
place, the commodity trading floor was 
also empty. But on the 11th floor, 
three brokers happened to be working 
late. That was lucky. They spoiled the 
smoke and, at 5.41 pm, promptly 
turned in the alarm. 
The fire department arrived with what 
one of the brokers who had spotted the 
fire called incredible speed." 
Two hook-and-ladders, four pumpers and 
one snorkel truck brought 35 
firefighters, who sized up the situation 
and sent for a doubling of the force as 
a backup precaution. Meanwhile, on the 
15th floor, the H&S personnel were 
displaying an instinctive talent for 
cool-headed action. At the alarm, the 
senior individual in each area assumed 
an informal role as group crisis leader. 
Emphasis was on getting people, not 
papers, out of harm's way the first 
rule in dealing with fire. Upon reaching 
exits leading to two stairways, the H&S 
people took the precaution to feel the 
lire d o o r s - a n d found them hot to the 
touch. So they made no attempt to open 
them. But neither did any of them risk 
using the elevators Instead, they all 
moved to another set of inferior fire 
stairs, clearly labeled thanks to a 
stiff provision in the city code, 
and descended to safety 
Because of the promptness of the alarm 
and the swift work of the fire brigade, 
the blaze was officially under control 
in twenty minutes. The newly refurbished 
10th floor wing was ruined and would 
need to be done over before its tenants 
could use it, and the heavy smell of 
smoke which had quickly spread to other 
floors had to be cleared. But the fire 
had a happy ending: no injuries. Next 
day, both on the commodity trading 
floor and in the H&S office, it 
was business as usual. 
At first thought ("or if compared with 
the Great Chicago Fire of 101 years ago] 
the Board of Trade Building fire might 
seem a me re fluke, a minor inconvenience 
to be quickly forgotten. On closer 
examination, however, the brief blaze 
takes on more meaning. The building 
had no fire warden system, nor had 
there been a fire drill within the 
preceding year. Although everybody got 
out safely, that fact owed too much to 
sheer good luck and individual initiative, 
and not enough to prior planning 
Although the Board of Trade Building 
is now forty-two years old, the fire in 
it bears meaning in surprising ways for 
those H&S staff members who have 
recently moved into office buildings of 
the very latest type—tall, sealed 
towers typically encased in glass and 
aluminum. To most people the ultramodern 
design of these sparkling new business 
quarters, with smooth-sided and 
impregnable-looking exteriors and neat 
plastic-and-metal interiors, gives a 
snug sense of security. Officially, too, 
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such structuresarecommonly considered 
'fireproof." Does this mean that fire 
safety is a fading subject that 
shortly can be forgotten? 
The emphatic, even startling, answer is 
'No." The new "fireproof" building designs 
contain a recently discovered set of 
fire hazards, which the older buildings 
do not. "There is no building standing 
today that is fireproof," Fire Chief 
William Stamm of Milwaukee 
has declared. "In plain words, these 
new high-rise office buildings can be 
death traps." Most other city fire 
chiefs across the country would agree. 
A spectacular series of fires in new skyscrapers within the past two years 
has shocked fire safety experts and 
brought about a new look in fire safety 
practices. Investigation of these fires 
has shown that smoke and heat, sealed 
within such shining air-conditioned 
buildings, spread to other floors with 
surprising speed and intensity. As a 
result, the experts are now sharply 
challenging the standards accepted as 
safe for the new architectural styles. 
Changes in someconstruction codes have 
already been made. Engineering 
experiments involving test fires 
deliberately set in large abandoned 
buildings are also being run in search 
for technical solutions to some of the 
problems which have no easy answer. 
For individuals who must escape from 
building fires, the traditional rules 
are being drastically tightened and, in 
some cases, changed to fit the newly 
recognized realities built into the big, 
air-tight new towers. 
The first blow to the general 
complacency which even the experts 
shared with the public came on August 
5,1970. In the financial district of 
New York, a huge and handsome 50-story 
office tower was just nearing completion 
at One New York Plaza, when fire broke 
out on the 33rd floor. Firemen had to 
fight the blaze for five hours before 
bringing it under control. That, in 
itself, was no record. But accustomed 
though they were to terrible conditions 
inside older burning buildings, some of 
the firemen were amazed at the density 
of smoke and the intensity of heat that 
they met. To win their battle, they 
would have to penetrate onto the 
fire floor. For a long time, high 
temperatures kept them at bay despite 
efforts which injured more than 30 
firemen. Soon the flames engulfed not 
only the 33rd floor but 
the 34th as well. 
One of the first things the hook-and-
ladder men always do in older buildings 
is to open windows to give the smoke 
and heat a natural path of escape. 
Here, the heavy, closed windows seemed 
to reflect heat back into the rooms, 
and concentrated the smoke. Unlike 
some new buildings, this one had windows 
that theoretically could be opened - but 
each one was held shut with five locks, 
at least one of which was higher than 
a man standing on the floor could reach. 
Of course the firemen knew that they 
could smash out the panes with their 
axes. But they hesitated, lest the heavy 
jagged shards should injure or kill 
pedestrians or firemen on the street 
below. Soon dense smoke made its 
way to all floors and into every 
nook and cranny. 
Several hundred people working an 
evening shift for the Chase Manhattan 
Bank were safely evacuated from the 
lower floors of the great building. 
In the meantime, a telephone installation 
foreman and two security guards had 
entered an elevator car to go up to the 
39th floor to warn people working there. 
Somehow, at the 33rd floor the car 
stopped. As the doors slid open, exposing 
the men to the flames, heavy smoke and 
searing heat poured in upon them. 
The elevator car doors jammed partly 
open, and the three men were trapped. 
Two hours later, by the time firemen 
finally battled their way up the stairs 
and into the elevator corridor, they 
found the two guards dead. Only the 
telephone man, lying beside them, was 
still alive. Rushed to the hospital, 
he survived. 
Most of the original fire floor and 
much of the one above it were in ashes, 
with congealed puddles of metal where 
once stood chairs and metal desks. 
The aluminum outer skin of the building 
at these levels was melted. Steel 
beams were so badly distorted that in 
some cases they broke loose from the 
bolts holding them in place. "Frankly, 
we had never seen anything like it." 
says New York Fire Chief John T. O'Hagan. 
"Fire wasn't supposed to jump from one 
floor to another in a high-rise." 
Various probes were launched to 
analyze the costly fire. Two of the 
most revealing were conducted by Chief 
O'Hagan, who spent days poking through 
the ruined floors and the spaces between 
them, and by Superintendent W. Robert 
Powers of the New York Board of Fire 
Underwriters, who independently pieced 
together the puzzling picture of the 
fire. Each soon became convinced that he 
was dealing not with an isolated 
disaster but with the results of 
inherent weaknesses in high-rise designs 
then accepted as safe. The features of 
the stricken tower were typical of 
hundreds of recently constructed 
skyscrapers (some holding up to 60,000 
people] and had been designed in 
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obedience to the lawful building codes. 
Four months later, before the building 
industry could recover from its shock 
at the reported details of the O'Hagan 
and Powers findings, afire in another 
midtown New York office tower at 919 
Third Avenue confirmed the danger. 
This time, three men were killed — 
again when their elevator stuck at the 
fire floor. Many others were forced to 
flee to the roof of the 47-story 
skyscraper when they could not find a 
safe way down. Attempting to walk down 
the stairs, they had encountered smoke 
and heat which drove them back up. 
And since then, other high-rise fires 
have produced additional tragedies, 
including one last year on the Avenue 
of The Americas in New York (in which 
a young woman died from smoke fumes 
in a room which never caught fire, after 
the offices of impresario Sol Hurok 
were ignited by an incendiary device); 
one in Korea (in which 163 died when a 
21-story hotel-office combination 
building burned out of control); and 
one in Brazil (where 300 were rescued 
by helicopter from the roof but 16 
others died and more than 400 were 
burned or injured, when fire totally 
gutted a 31-story building). 
T he disasters revealed that almost every distinguishing characteristic of 
modern high-rise design contains 
a fire peril; 
• CENTRAL AIR CONDITIONING, now 
an expected boon to summertime workers, 
can spread poisonous fumes and 
smoke from sub-basement to penthouse 
and also fan the flames. Automatic 
detection devices, with automatic shut-off 
of the fans, seem to be a partial answer. 
• SEALED WINDOWS, or those locked 
by heavy latches like those at One New 
York Plaza, prevent needed venting of 
heat and smoke. Thus bottled in, fumes 
and heat build up to unprecedented 
levels. Occupants, unless they smash a 
window, may run out of oxygen or 
succumb even earlier to lethal fumes. 
Despite the very real danger to people 
on the street, trapped persons have no 
choice but to break a window. The 
New York Fire Department is trying to 
have a new tool developed with which a 
fireman can make the glass fall inside 
the room when he breaks a pane. 
• PLASTIC CONTENTS, combustible 
to various degrees, frequently include 
foam plastic wall insulation, ceiling 
tiles, partitions, insulation wrapped 
around telephone and electrical lines 
and cushioned furniture. 'Buildings of 
this type erected in this Plastic Age," 
says Superintendent Powers, "should 
more correctly be called 'semi-
combustible'." Worse, even before some 
of the foam plastics get hot enough to 
burn, they exude fumes which can float 
to areas not yet touched by fire. 
These fumes are lethal when breathed 
and may themselves burst into flaming 
clouds as they billow darkly from floor 
to floor. While not all office building 
contents can be made fire-resistant in 
practical terms-such as papers, 
glues and computer tapes—the total 
switch to the right types of plastic 
could enormously reduce the smoke 
and fire hazards. 
• OPEN SPACES BETWEEN FLOORS 
(known as plenums), usually crammed 
with power and communication cables 
and ducts for air, are not partitioned with 
fire barriers as were the crawl spaces 
in older masonry-walled buildings. 
These open areas permit heat and smoke 
to sweep freely from area to area, 
sometimes reaching other vertical 
spaces behind the curtain-wall skin of 
the building. Like furnace flues, the 
spaces feed the flames and carry 
them to higher levels. 
• ELEVATOR SHAFTS may also act as 
chimneys for poisonous smoke. For 
this reason, and because the elevator 
cars may become stuck at fire floors 
because of warping doors, melting of 
control cables or other reasons, 
elevators are the worst way to get out 
of a building that is on fire.The 
fire itself may activate heat-sensitive 
call buttons or melt the wires in old-
fashioned push-button systems and thus 
summon the cars and their occupants to 
the center of the outbreak. In some 
cities, adjustments will be made to 
bring all elevator cars automatically 
to the lobby when a fire is detected 
or an alarm rung, whereafter they will 
be operable only by firemen using a 
special key giving them manual control. 
• FIRE STAIRS are the best way out, 
but cases where smoke or heat entered 
them has given the experts pause. Some 
are arguing for a return to required 
fire-tower stairs, opening to the 
outside for fresh air. Another 
possibility supported by recent 
experiments is to pressurize the 
stairwells with air to keep 
noxious gases out. 
• HEIGHT of towers made feasible by 
modern steel support and light-weight 
curtain walls places ever greater 
numbers of people, and the fire 
hazards which shadow them, far above 
the reach of the longest ladders. 
About 100 feet, or ten stories, appears 
to be the practical limit for ladders. 
Thus, fires at higher levels can no 
longer be reached or people rescued 
from the outside. 
• STEEL SKELETONS, though they 
might seem perfectly fireproof, will 
weaken and melt if heated high enough 
and long enough. Those damaged in the 
One New York Plaza fire were engineered 
to have a "fire rating" of four hours— 
but the blaze went on for more than 
five. Also, fiber insulation that had 
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been sprayed on the steel supports as 
part of their rated fire-resistive 
qualities had fallen off in some places 
and been scraped away in others by 
workmen. Better insulation techniques 
are being perfected, but even without 
them the collapse of a modern steel 
skeleton appears a far more remote 
danger than the direct hazard to human 
life posed by heat. And even the heat 
is less perilous than smoke. 
• EVACUATION TIMES for some of 
the larger buildings make it doubtful 
that all occupants can get out during 
a major fire. With the best conceivable 
fire stairs, 25 to 50 thousand people 
would need hours to walk down. What 
about up-to-date versions of the old 
schoolhouse sliding fire chutes? There 
was one in a Japanese building only 
seven stories high that burned last 
May, killing 116 people. The chutes did 
not work, possibly because the people 
trying to use them did not know how; 
some people using the chutes survived 
the attempt, but some crashed to the 
pavement and died. The only real 
answer seems to be overturning the old 
dictum: "Always get out," —and in 
its place establishing places of safe 
refuge within the building. Learning 
to go to these locations for air and 
flame protection instead of following 
one of the oldest fire-escape rules 
obviously will demand careful planning 
and effective re-education. 
A side from the engineering improvements shown to be needed, the big lesson in 
the skyscraper fires was the importance 
of not wasting time. One reason the 
fire at New York Plaza grew so large, 
firemen believe, was a delayed alarm 
to the department. In all the fires, 
there was confusion among occupants. 
They did not know what to do and had 
nobody to tell them. What is vitally 
needed is a system of fire wardens 
within buildings to assume leadership 
in time of crisis.The twin need is for 
a serious revival of fire drills to 
familiarize every person with the 
routes and procedures for escape. 
A recent survey of several H&S offices 
by H&S Reports reveals that far too few 
have designated fire safety wardens, 
or hold regular fire drills. 
H&S practices in this matter are 
probably typical of the norm throughout 
the business world, but if so it 
reflects a widespread misconception 
that serious fire hazards are largely 
a bugaboo of the past. More of them 
might well follow the example of the 
Boston H&S office, where six wardens and 
deputy wardens have been appointed. 
They are people whose work keeps them 
in the office most of the time, and 
among them they have been given 
responsibility for clearing all sections 
of the office in case of emergency. 
They have attended meetings called by 
the building manager and have held their 
own meetings to discuss fire plans. 
New York City, acting in the wake of 
its several big building fires, this 
year put into effect new laws which 
require every tall or large building 
to appoint an official fire director, 
who must pass a training course given 
by the fire department. The fire 
director must have an up-to-date, 
written, detailed fire plan that has 
been approved by the fire department. 
And he must appoint fire wardens and 
deputies for all floors. Thus, somebody 
who knows how to lead and what to do 
will always be there. 
Fire drills, often greeted with bored 
cynicism by busy employees who have 
not thought about the dangers of 
ignorance in a fire, are also vital. Few 
people who have not lived through a fire 
realize how a leaderless group of 
mature people without proper training 
can reach the edge of panic, or how 
suddenly smoke can make it impossible 
tosee or breathe. Knowledge and 
planning and training, however, can serve 
as a great protection in an emergency 
Communications between workers, 
wardens, fire director and professional 
firemen are essential, yet a fire can cut all 
regular channels. In New York, each 
building must install a command post 
from which firemen and the fire 
director can speak to all parts of all 
floors by public address systems, can 
control elevators, power, light and air 
flow, and can keep track of the battle. 
The revived emphasis on fire 
preparedness is important to every H&S 
staff member, whether or not he or she 
works in a new-style tower. The 
buildings housing our eighty offices 
comprise a wide-ranging catalogue of 
architectural styles, sizes and periods. 
But even if all had been stamped from a 
single cookie-cutter pattern, H&S 
people would meet a variety of fire-
risk conditions elsewhere in their lives. 
On any given working day, a substantial 
number of the staff are working on 
the home grounds of clients, whose 
offices may be in small, timeworn 
structures, or nestled against 
manufacturing plants, or perched high 
in new skyscrapers. Hotels and 
motels add still another risk 
for traveling staffers. 
The normal probabilities of fire 
starting in any building are especially 
heightened during construction, 
renovation, decoration or repair. The 
economics of real estate management 
dictate that some users of a building's 
office space must move in before such 
work is 100% completed, despite the 
extra risks stemming from welder's 
arcs, flammable construction materials 
and so forth. Both the New York Plaza 
and Third Avenue buildings were partly 
occupied but not yet quite finished; 
the Japanese fire was caused by a 
careless electrician; the Chicago Board 
of Trade Building was undergoing an 18-
month modernization program upgrading 
its heating, cooling, electrical, water, 
elevator and fire-stair systems. And 
the floor where a limited but very 
smoky fire started a few months back 
in the Drake Hotel in New York, which 
drove several H&S staffers in the city 
for Report Review Week to seek another 
hotel for the night, was also 
undergoing changes. 
On balance, there is no money-back way 
to avoid ever being in a building that 
catches fire. But there are ways to 
guarantee the best chances of 
safe escape. 
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Remember these rules: 
1. Call the city fire department. 
This means always, whenever you sniff 
smoke or spot the flicker of a flame, even 
if you believe another occupant or even 
the building employees are also calling. 
2. Don't fight it yourself. The only 
exception would be for a tiny paper fire 
contained in a metal wastebasket or an 
ashtray - and then only try for 30 
seconds. But, even before your half-
minute of heroics, call the fire 
department first. 
3. Save yourself, not your papers. 
Your life is what you and your 
colleagues care about. 
4. Don't wait until the day the fire 
starts. Check your own office and 
escape routes from it in advance until 
you can find your way blindfolded. 
Know your fire wardens so you can get 
reliable information quickly. 
5. Spot exits in strange buildings. 
Look for the fire escapes as you enter 
new client work places. 
6. Don't use elevators. Use fire stairs. 
7. Test doors with the flat of your 
hand. If hot, don't open. And close 
every door you pass to keep smoke and 
heat from following you. 
8. Don't give up if you can't get out. 
Think calmly and find a refuge. Get 
into a room where you can close the 
door and which has a window Don't jump. 
Stay close to the window, but near the 
floor where temperatures and 
fumes will be far less. 
9. Get air! Toxic fumes are your worst 
enemy. Smash a window it necessary, 
using a chair or a typewriter or other 
heavy object (but don't let the object 
fall with the glass). Break it both at 
top, to let heat and smoke out, and at 
bottom, to lei fresh air in. 
10. Don't dawdle! When a fire is 
suspected, act. Flames and fumes move 
fast. And so must you. • 
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